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From Construction to Conceptualization: Catastrophe across Three Occasions
John Barnshaw and Lynn Letukas

Abstract
This paper explores the process of developing and refining the conceptualization of
catastrophe utilizing the extant literature collected following the Chernobyl nuclear
reactor leak, the Indian Ocean tsunami, and the BP oil spill. A catastrophe is different
from a disaster in that most or all of a community or area is impacted, many local
individuals are unable to undertake their usual roles, the community undergoes a period
of prolonged inoperability, media plays an increasing role in the construction of the
public perception of the occasion, and the political arena shifts from a local or regional
issue to a national or international issue. The distinction between disaster and catastrophe
is not simply an academic one, as national and international policymakers have recently
become sensitized to differences between these occasions, and emergency management
professionals and policymakers have asserted that more academic research is needed to
empirically falsify conceptualization distinctions. This paper offers additional conceptual
clarification on catastrophe and emphasizes the benefits of utilizing specialized disaster
research collections to access high quality data on catastrophe across social and
geographic boundaries.
From Construction…
For more than a half century, disaster and crisis researchers have struggled to define and
conceptualize their central object of study. In 1950, when the first team of social science
disaster researchers assembled at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the
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University of Chicago, one of those scholars, Robert Endleman (1952), defined disaster
as: ―an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively selfsufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its
members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the
fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented.‖
Although the Endleman definition was not published for nine years, it encapsulatedmany
of the central concepts and concerns of the earliest disaster researchers (Quarantelli,
2006). Endleman’s definition of disaster gained considerable attention amongsociologists
with the publication of Charles Fritz’s chapter in Robert Merton and Robert Nisbet’s
widely read Contemporary Social Problems (1961). More than 45 years later, Tierney
(2007:505) acknowledges that the Endleman/Fritz definition of disaster remains ―highly
influential‖ in how many researchers understand disaster.
Although the Endleman/Fritz definition is the most cited definition of disaster in the
social sciences, there are several methodological, theoretical and substantive issues that
make its use problematic for disaster researchers (Tierney, Lindell and Perry, 2001). The
Endleman/Fritz definition is methodologically problematic because the short term―event
concentrated in time and space‖ that disrupts the ―essential functions of the society‖ was
reinforced by a methodological approach that emphasized the importance of gathering
short-term observations and data that were deemed ephemeral (Fritz, 1961:655; Natural
Hazards Application and Information Center 2011; Stallings, 2002). Although some
outstanding quantitative surveys (Bolin and Bolton, 1999; Brodie et al., 2006; Moore,
1958), and some long-term ethnographic work has resulted from these initial quick
response research trips (Oliver-Smith, 1999; Picou et al. 1992), the vast majority has been
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qualitative interviews that are post-hoc and limited in generalizability beyond the initial
impressions of those impacted. This is not to say that these data are not important, indeed
we believe that they have been essential to the development of the field of disaster
research. Our point in drawing attention to the post-hoc approach is to note how the
methodological approach has influenced the findings and theorizing that conceptualizes
disaster as an aberrant disruption of the social system.
Tangentially related to the methodological focus on ―event‖ is that when findings
generated from quick response or ephemeral data are reported, they are often
contextualized in a theoretical approach that is often a theory of the middle range that is
limited in scope and generalizability (Blau, 1995; Stallings, 1998; Tierney, 2007). Thus,
by focusing on broader methodologies and more inclusive data collection processes that
allow for broader theoretical development beyond theories that are narrowly tailored to
explain phenomenon such as how individuals perceive warning messages or how
organizations adapt in disaster may lead to more robust sociological inquiry and theory
development.
Substantively, there are also two problems with the Endleman/Fritz definition of disaster.
First, the use of ―event‖ focuses both the researcher and the research on one singular
event as the genesis of a particular disaster, which often, is not the case. Quarantelli
(1998) and Perry (1998) have both pointed out that since disasters are social
constructions, rather than purely physical phenomena, agents, social systems and
societies influence disaster. Therefore, although certain moments may play a larger role
in disaster than others, even what may appear to be the most singular event is actually the
product of a longer history of preconditions for disaster. For example, Oliver-Smith
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(1999) demonstrated that the devastation resulting from the Peru earthquake on May 31,
1970 was the product of nearly five hundred years of South American settlement
location, planning and building techniques.
The second substantive problem with the Endleman/Fritz definition is that one runs the
risk of ontological gerrymandering, which is the illicit insistence on defining a term in a
way that is favorable to one’s own understanding of a phenomenon (Blackburn, 1996;
Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985). For example, in a search of disaster definitions, Westgate
and O’Keefe (1976) found that the majority of previous definitions were programmatic
declarations that were useful for politicians and policymakers in declaring an area as a
disaster rather than offering definitive criteria that would be useful for systematically
defining or establishing boundaries of the phenomenon. Ontological gerrymandering
does not appear to be simply a political problem as Dombrowsky (1998:20) notes that
among disaster researchers ―we see what we want to see.‖
Thus, by focusing only on issues that are germane to the politician, policymaker, or
disaster researcher, one runs the risk of creating favorable definitions that support one’s
own understanding of disaster while potentially excluding substantive findings that are
deemed ―problematic.‖ For example, consider the classical Endleman/Fritz (1961:655)
definition where disaster is seen as generating ―severe danger‖ to a community resulting
in destruction of ―physical appurtenances‖ and ―losses to its members.‖ This definition
easily conjures up images of what most people traditionally consider the domain of
―natural disasters‖ such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and tsunamis.
However, consider for a moment research by Klinenberg (2002) on the 1995 Chicago
heatwave where 521 people died with almost no
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destruction or devastation to physical appurtenances. Should the Chicago heatwave,
clearly a ―natural‖ meteorological occasion generating exceptional disruption to the
community be excluded from the definition of a disaster because it did very little damage
or destruction to physical appurtenances?
A potential solution to the methodological, theoretical and substantive problems of the
Endleman/Fritz definition is to develop a conceptualization of disasters based upon social
occasions and exceptions. In contrast to definitions that purportedly offer a definite, or
final account of a phenomenon, a conceptualization is a process that sensitizes the
researcher to certain ongoing aspects of the social world (Neuman, 2003).
A major advantage of sensitizing concepts is that they can be used to draw attention to
important social features that otherwise may have been missed, thereby limiting the
influence of ontological gerrymandering (Charmaz, 2003; Padgett, 2004; Bowen, 2006).
Although sensitizing concepts are generally used in an inductive manner (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990), we think that deductive approaches can be
applied to sensitizing concepts in a study. For example, there are numerous observations
and propositions developed by prior scholars about behavior in general and also
specifically in disasters. We follow this convention in an attempt to determine whether
or not behavior in catastrophe is similar or different from prior research.
The potential solution to the problem of the Endleman/Fritz focus on the ―event‖
concentrated approach is to avoid the determinism associated ―event‖ and focus on
projects, social occasions, and exceptions. Dynes (1998:113) notes that ―event‖ can
imply a determinism that if an earthquake, hurricane or terrorist attack is going to take
place, there are few measures agents or social systems can take to prevent it. To avoid
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this pitfall, Dynes (1998:113) recommends the concept of ―occasion,‖ which offers a
more effective organizing concept. Occasion provides a socially defined process that is
contextually bound beyond the fixed temporality of ―event‖ into a ―before,‖ ―during‖
and ―after.‖ Thus, the occasion serves as the catalyst that ―generates‖ exceptions, or
social disruption, that is part of a larger historical project of ―before,‖ ―during‖ and
―after‖ disaster (Kreps, 1998). In our view, this advancement over the traditional
understanding of disaster is not without its own issues and greater clarification is
necessary in what is meant by project, exception, and scale, which is where we turn next.
Projects, Exceptions and Scale
Retrospectively constructing the past is hardly novel in sociology or disaster research.
The French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1897) retroactively gathered data about suicides
in France and drew inferences about his subject to better understand how social
solidarity, or a lack thereof, influences the likelihood of suicide. Moreover, for more than
a century in American sociology, race scholars have developed rather sophisticated
conceptual schemes for retrospectively constructing the racial history of individuals and
societies (DuBois, 1920; Feagin, 2010; McKee, 1993). In disaster research, the Canadian
sociologist Samuel Prince (1920) retrospectively studied the individual and community
response to 1917 Halifax explosion to better understand catastrophe and social change.
This current research offers an expanded conceptualization of projects to emphasize their
social construction as well as their composition of fields, structures, agents, and
arrangements to construct a conceptualization that attempts to take each of these
intersecting processes into account through operational means. Central to the use of
projects is to understand how they exist at a current period of time and how they change.
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Historically situated projects will continue into perpetuity until a social exception occurs.
An exception is a substantial deviation from the constructed project. Exceptions differ
from fluctuations in that they substantially alter the field, structures, agents and/or
arrangements of the constructed project.
There are two general propositions consistent with all types of exceptions. First,
exceptions generate uncertainty. No matter how small, large or complex an exception,
there is a period where the substantial deviation is undefined or unknown. Second,
irrespective of the type of exception, some action will occur. At any given time, some
individuals, organizations or subsets of society will have an interest in developing new
possibilities brought about by the exception or attempting to restore some of what was
previously constituted by the exception. Thus, once an exception has occurred, it is not
possible for inaction to result in a constructed project but rather, a new project is in the
process of formation or reformation. This is not to say that all fields, structures, agents or
arrangements must participate in some type of action, it simply indicates that some fields
or structures, agents, or arrangements will engage in action in an attempt to resolve the
exception.

Disaster is an ideal context for studying exceptions because they are often

behaviorally observable rather than asking about lines of action constructed solely in the
mind (Mead, 1934). Thus, by focusing on disasters as exceptions, researchers are able to
assess social change in the historically constructed before, during and after disaster.
Immediately before, during, and following a disaster, routine patterns of action are
significantly disrupted as well as the social structures and built environment. In an effort
to better understand what has been lost and what has been retained from a project, our
view is that it is essential to understand the scale or size of an exception. To measure

126

scale, we attempt to understand exceptions in their impact on the routines or rituals of
individuals, organizations, communities in the social and physical fields they inhabit.
Therefore, within the context of an exception exists a continuum of based upon the scale
of the exception. Figure 1.1 describes a continuum of social exceptions ranging in scale
from emergency (smallest level of exception) to extinction level occasion (largest level of
exception).
First, an emergency is an exception involving first responders that is often resolved with
little disruption to larger communities and social structures in the project. Second, a
mass/complex emergency is a complex exception such as a large traffic accident or plane
crash that is often resolved through complex responses that do not constitute significant
disruption to communities and social structures. Third, a disaster is an occasion
generating exceptional social and structural disruption. Fourth, a catastrophe is an
occasion generating exceptions where most or all of the community is impacted, local
officials are unable to undertake their usual work roles and the community undergoes a
period of prolonged inoperability. Finally, an extinction level occasion is an exception
generating substantial challenges to all communities and social structures in a region.
Figure 1.1 – Continuum of Exception Occasions
Emergency
Mass/Complex Emergency
Disaster
Catastrophe
Extinction Level Occasion
A complex emergency, such as a plane crash, may result in exceptions to routines, but
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not to the extent that the exceptions constitute a significant disruption to communities and
social structures. Thus, authorities and emergency professionals are able to respond in
such a way that most members of a community and social institutions are not adversely
impacted. Conversely, a disaster is not sufficiently as large as a catastrophe. Given our
understanding of disaster and the level of exceptions generated, we hypothesize that our
current project of analysis, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill emanating from the Deepwater
Horizon is a catastrophe rather than the smaller exception of a disaster. However, a
better understanding of the difference in scale of exceptions between disaster and
catastrophe is necessary, which is where we turn next.
Data and Methods
This paper utilizes a case study methodology (Yin, 2009). Case study methodology is a
research design that focuses on one or more specific instances, institutions, or occasions
(cases) for the purpose of exploring a process that may not necessarily be generalizable in
a statistical sense. The case study methodology is ideal for examining contemporary
events when behavior cannot be manipulated because it allows for a blending of various
data sources to provide greater explanatory power than the historical method (Yin, 2009).
Although a case study methodology may include up to six sources of evidence
(documents, archival records, interviews and surveys, direct observation, participant
observation and physical artifacts), this paper utilized documentary and archival records
(Yin, 2009). Documentary sources of evidence included memoranda, administrative
information, Congressional testimony transcripts, after action reports by private and
public sector entities as well as annual reports of several of the parties involved such as
British Petroleum, Halliburton and Transocean for a total of 19 documents. Archival
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records included three newspapers including two national newspapers (The New York
Times; The Washington Post) and one newspaper located in the impacted region (The
Times-Picayune – New Orleans, LA). These two national newspapers have the highest
circulation in the United States, and in particular, the Washington Post provides detailed
coverage of political and governmental involvement in national issues and events. Since
two of our propositions of catastrophe include the national media increasing role in the
construction of the occasion, and the extent to which the event receives national and
international political coverage, we concluded that the New York Times and the
Washington Post would be ideal sources to examine the extent to which the oil spill was
the subject of national media attention. We also examined one local newspaper The
Times-Picayune because it provided detailed coverage of how local communities were
impacted by the oil spill. Our time period of analysis included April 20, 2010, the day of
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, to September 10, 2010,
two days following the release of the internal report from British Petroleum (BP)
detailing the cause of the explosion, which allowed for a detailed analysis of the media
construction of the short-term response and recovery efforts as well as coverage of the BP
investigation (Tierney, Lindell, and Perry, 2001).
We used Lexis-Nexis Academic to conduct a full-text database search using two search
terms that were determined to be the most frequently used to describe the oil spill by the
mass media, after preliminary examination of articles in all three newspapers: ―BP oil
spill,‖ ―BP,‖ and ―Deep Water Horizon.‖ The Lexis-Nexis search identified a total of
2,342 newspaper articles, all of which were subjected to three selection criteria
(duplication, relevance, content), following which a combined total of 2,252 articles
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remained. Finally, we selected a sub-sample of every tenth article resulting in 62 New
York Times, 45 Washington Post and 119 Times- Picayune articles (N=229).
In order to explore and attempt to falsify the conceptualization of catastrophe as
developed by Quarantelli (2006), this research utilized a deductive methodological
approach in its analysis of news content. The software program ATLAS.ti 6.0 was used
for the coding and analysis of these articles. After the initial coding, all codes, notes and
memos were read through and analyzed. Representative quotations were then selected,
some of which have been used in the presentation of our findings, which is where we turn
next.
We used this existing knowledge and understanding of what has been established goes
on in disasters by contrasting it with what we think we can see in catastrophes. For this
purpose, we selectively drew mostly, but not exclusively, from the social features of the
Chernobyl nuclear plant radiation fallout, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Northeast
blackout in 2003, and Hurricane Katrina. These four occasions were used for several
reasons. Even the initial press reports of their occurrences left a strong impression that
they were considerably beyond typical disasters. There is also a substantial literature,
popular and scientific, easily accessible for all four occurrences. Finally there are some
diversities, not only in terms of the hazards and risks involved (e.g. radiation fallout,
tsunami, hurricane and flood, critical infra structure accident) but also what parts of the
world were affected including rather different political and social systems as well as
cultural and lifestyle frameworks.
Catastrophe as a Social Exception
Although there are a number of recent summaries and reviews of the literature on
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disaster (Tierney, Lindell and Perry, 2001; National Research Council, 2006: Rodriguez,
Quarantelli and Dynes, 2006) prior research by Quarantelli (1982; 1993; 2006) has
suggested that catastrophes may be fundamentally different from disasters in several
important ways. A catastrophe is a social occasion that generates exceptions where most
or all of (1) the community structure is impacted, (2) the community rituals or routines
are disrupted and local officials are unable to undertake their routine work roles, (3) help
from nearby communities cannot be provided due to the scale of the exception (4) the
community undergoes a period of prolonged inoperability, (5) the mass media socially
construct the occasion, and (6) the political arena emerges as increasingly significant in
dealing with the response. Figure 1.2 provides a chart of the conceptual characteristics of
catastrophe of we shall describe below.

Figure 1.2 – Conceptual Characteristics of Catastrophe
[paste figure]
First, in a catastrophe most or all of the community built structure is heavily impacted.
For example, in the 2010 Haiti earthquake, at least 230,000 persons were killed and more
than one million—nearly ten percent of the entire country--were left homeless (British
Broadcasting Corporation, 2010). In contrast, in the 1985 Mexico City earthquake,
considered a disaster, less than two percent of the residential housing structure stock was
lost, with only 4.9 percent of the population reporting great damage to the building in
which they lived in and around Mexico City (Quarantelli, 2006).
The radiation fallout from Chernobyl fell not only in the northern parts of the Soviet
Union such as Belarus, but in the center of Europe such as in Germany, and as far north
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as in the Arctic Circle in 11 Sweden and Finland. Apart from these locations and sites
where the fall out created a real threat, the radiation cloud circled around the globe
(although as was later found out, it did not create a real risk in that lengthy journey). The
tsunami differently impacted at least a dozen nation states around the Indian Ocean in a
circle extending from southeast Asia to the coast of Eastern Africa.
Finally, because of mass media focus on the city of New Orleans, it is not well known
that
Hurricane
Second, in a catastrophe most or all of the community rituals or routines are disrupted
and local officials are unable to undertake their routine work roles. Sociologist Randall
Collins (2004) has argued that individuals use symbols to form the basis of interaction
and routines, which, in turn, form ritual chains of interaction. These micro-level
interactions form the basis of social structures and much of what is found in the mesoand macro-levels of society. Thus, when a socio-historical project experiences an
exception, social change is often experienced at the interactional micro-level. Related to
this observation, when a catastrophe occurs, local personnel specializing in catastrophic
occasions are often unable to carry out their formal and organizational work roles
(Quarantelli, 2006). This is because some local workers are either dead or injured, and/or
are unable to communicate the knowledge or skills they routinely provide (Barnshaw,
Letukas and Quarantelli, 2008). For example, in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
practically all government officials were killed by the impact, fisherman were unable to
fish, health professionals were unable to provide routine assistance in hospitals and
thousands of foreign tourists were stranded (Letukas, 2008; Letukas, Olofsson and
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Barnshaw, 2009). In sharp contrast, in disasters routine patterns for large sections of
society are maintained as following the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles
12,000 people went to the horseracing track the afternoon of the earthquake (Barnshaw,
Letukas and Quarantelli 2006).
Third, in a catastrophe most or all of the help from nearby communities cannot be
provided due to the scale of the exception. In many catastrophes most of the residents in a
particular community affected, but often, those in nearby localities are also impacted. In
1986, many areas around Chernobyl after the accident at the nuclear plant were unable to
respond for risk of contamination (Porforiev, 1998). In short, catastrophes affect multiple
communities, and often have a regional character.
Fourth, in a catastrophe most or all of the community undergoes a period of prolonged
inoperability. In addition to most assistance coming from distant individuals,
organizations and communities, the impacted communities are often inoperable or
unusable for a period of time (Quarantelli, 2006). For example, following the 1986
nuclear accident at Chernobyl almost the entire community has been displaced and most
have not returned nearly 25 years after the occasion (Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation, 2010).
Fifth, in a catastrophe the mass media system, especially in recent times, socially
constructs the occasion. All disasters evoke at least local mass media coverage. Some
disasters can attract attention from outside the local community media, to draw regional,
national and at times, international attention. However, this disaster coverage rarely lasts
beyond the first few days, or at most, the first month depending upon competing news
cycles (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Even media coverage following the September 11,
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2001 attacks of the occasion dropped off considerably after the first few weeks except in
the impacted metropolitan areas of New York and Washington. In contrast to disasters,
mass media coverage of catastrophe differs in that there is generally much more and
longer coverage by regional and national mass media than local media. This is partly
because local coverage is reduced, if not totally displaced, during and following the
exception.
In the Northeast blackout it was only 20 seconds between a last major mistake in a
Michigan control room and the initiation of a cascading electric grid power failure in the
US East Coast and south east Canada. While the Soviet government tried to keep secret
the radiation fallout from the accident at Chernobyl, radiation monitors located in
Sweden identified a serious problem within hours. In the instance of Hurricane Katrina
and the Pacific tsunami, at the very time of physical impact, it was clear to victims and
affected communities just from visual perceptions that there were going to be serious
consequences. In the Soviet Union some occurrences probably were catastrophes (see
Oberg, 1986 for cases), but it was not until the Chernobyl nuclear radiation fallout
crossed international boundaries that forced a reluctant official public admission about a
catastrophe.
Finally, because of the previous five processes, in a catastrophe the political arena
becomes even more important in dealing with the impact and response. All disasters
involve, at a minimum, local political considerations. However, it is a radically different
occasion when the national government and elite officials become directly involved
(Quarantelli, 2006). Even with the most socially prominent disasters, such as the
September 11, 2001 attacks, a symbolic presence is often all that is necessary. However,
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in catastrophes, that symbolism is not enough, particularly for larger society. Part of this
stems from the fact that catastrophes often force larger society to deal with the most
fundamental constructions of the previously constituted project.
For example, as the levees were breached and the floodwaters rose in New Orleans
following Hurricane Katrina, television images of thousands of citizens trapped outside
the Louisiana Superdome and New Orleans Convention Center, without adequate food
and water, caused many Americans to ―rediscover‖ the urban underclass as well as racial
and ethnic differences that are papered over during routine occasions (Barnshaw, 2006).
The Soviets had no system in place for warning distant localities about a radiation risk
from an accident at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. There seems to have been a mostly
untested and therefore mostly unknown plan in place for alerting the surrounding
population. While there were a number of technical monitoring mechanisms in place
within the nuclear plant complex itself to indicate serious malfunctions or danger, as far
as is known, they were mostly misread or ignored although plant personnel in the control
room knew rather quickly that something very bad was happening and accelerating. On
top of everything else, most of the authorities, local and otherwise, tried to keep the
developing risk as secret as possible. Thus, for all practical purposes, there was little by
way of a warning system.
However, catastrophes typically involve multitudes of organizations in different formal
jurisdictions. That compounds the problem of coordination. Hurricane Katrina, the
Chernobyl nuclear accident, and the Indiana Ocean tsunami abound with incident after
incident where there was lack of interorganizational coordination. Wolshon (2008) in a
recent publication suggests and implies that in recent and upcoming megadisasters that
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are somewhat regional in nature, there are many coordination problems because of the
multiplicity of responding groups involved that operate in often different governmental
jurisdiction, and a cutting across of bureaucratic boundaries.
Another reason the political arena is increasingly important during and following a
catastrophe is that it is easy to take partisan political advantage of such times as
organizational weaknesses of responding organizations becomes obvious. For example,
following the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, the Soviet government initially
tried to keep the the catastrophic failure secret, but when this was not possible due to
radiation monitors in Sweden, the political cost had to be paid by Soviet actors and
institutions (Porforiev, 2006).
Given our understanding of catastrophe, we hypothesize that our current project of
analysis, the Gulf of Mexico oil spill emanating from the Deepwater Horizon, is a
catastrophe rather than the smaller exception of a disaster. First, however, a better
understanding of our methodological approach and data utilized is necessary, which is
where we turn next.
Finally, there is a question if the conception of a catastrophe necessarily requires high
death tolls and extensive property damage. It might seem that if there are rather high
casualties and large property damage in a given occasion, it is likely to be a catastrophe.
That would especially follow if high or large numbers are used as differentiating criteria
for that kind of occasion.
However, even rough numbers from Chernobyl on those initially killed and injured as
well as property damage are surprisingly low (Russian disaster researchers have told us
that despite the dubiousness of most statistics from the Soviet Union, the post Chernobyl
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numbers are reasonable ―ballpark figures‖). The possible later radiation poisonings that
may have been resulting in child birth defects, a rise in cancer rates and other health
problems seemed to surface more than a decade later. On the other hand, there is no
doubt that in the immediate aftermath of the nuclear plant explosion there were very
major social disruptions in parts of Russia and nearby countries, very similar to what
happened in the immediate aftermaths of Hurricane Katrina and the Pacific tsunami.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to classify Chernobyl when it happened as a catastrophe.
Whatever may have surfaced a decade later is hardly what should be used for
classification purposes, although from a research viewpoint it might suggest the need and
value of studying longer run as well as shorter run quantitative outcomes of collective
crises.
Findings
Previously, Quarantelli (1993; 2006) has asserted that catastrophe is a social occasion
that generates exceptions where most or all of (1) the community structure is impacted,
(2) the community rituals or routines are disrupted and local officials are unable to
undertake their routine work roles, (3) help from nearby communities cannot be provided
due to the scale of the exception (4) the community undergoes a period of prolonged
inoperability, (5) the mass media socially construct the occasion, and (6) the political
arena emerges as increasingly significant in dealing with the response. Based upon our
analysis of archival sources and documentation we generally find support for these
claims.
INSERT FIGURE 1.3 HERE
First, in a catastrophe most or all of the community built structure is heavily impacted.
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The Deepwater Horizon explosion is relatively unique to the study of catastrophe in that
in most catastrophes the heavy physical loss of community structure is readily
observable. However, in some catastrophes such as the 1986 nuclear reactor accident at
Chernobyl the community built structure was heavily impacted in that it was deemed
inoperable or unusuable although still largely intact. Similarly, following the Deepwater
Horizon explosion, we find substantial evidence of community built structures being
heavily impacted, most notably along the Gulf of Mexico, with the largest economic
costs in the urban centers such as New Orleans.
In our analysis of the BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (2010) there
is no mention of individuals, organizations or communities being impacted or heavily
impacted by the accident (British Petroleum, 2010). However, in the Report to the
President by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling (2011), we found numerous instances of community destruction and
impact. First, and most directly impacted was the community on the oil rig Deepwater
Horizon, where 11 of the 126 crew were killed and 16 others were seriously injured
(National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
2011). Approximately 36 hours after the initial exception that led to the explosion on the
Deepwater Horizon intensive fire-fighting efforts were unable to save the $560 million
oil platform, which sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico (Transocean, 2010). The
explosion on the Deepwater Horizon set off a cascading exception resulting in an
estimated 52,700 to 62,200 barrels of oil spilling per day into the Gulf for a total of
approximately 4.9 million barrels, by far the largest maritime oil spill in United States
history (National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
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Drilling, 2011).
The spill is estimated to cover a concentrated area of 2,500 miles and a diffuse area of
68,000 square miles with more than 600 miles of shoreline being fouled in five states
(Norse and Amos, 2010). This tremendous oil spill has long-term implications for the
ecological sustainability of the Gulf of Mexico and similar to Chernobyl, the full impact
will not be realized for years.
Second, in a catastrophe most or all of the community rituals or routines are disrupted
and local officials are unable to undertake their routine work roles. In the afore
mentioned commission report (2011), there was evidence of substantial disruption to
environmentally sensitive ecologies that have dramatically impacted the seafood and
tourism industries, two of the largest components of the regional economy (National
Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). In
2008, Gulf Coast fisheries harvested 1.27 billion pounds of fish and shellfish generating
$659 million in revenue (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2010). In
addition to the commercial fishing industry, there were an estimated 3.2 million fishers in
the Gulf Coast region who took 24 million trips (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, 2010). Following the Deepwater Horizon spill, approximately 33
percent of all federal waters were closed extending as far away from Louisiana as
Panama City Beach Florida.
Tourism generates an estimated $19.7 billion annually in the Gulf Coast region, with
approximately 50 percent of the total coming from Florida (United States Census Bureau,
2007). In addition to the disruption of employees of the fishing and tourism industries
the impact of the oil spill has also adversely impacted the health of many Gulf residents.

139

While the long-term effects of contamination may not be known for years, the disruption
in loss of jobs and income due to the spill is salient in the 25 percent increase in clinical
depression among Gulf facing counties since the oil spill (National Commission on the
BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011).
Third, in a catastrophe most or all of the help from nearby communities cannot be
provided due to the scale of the exception. Within moments of the Deepwater Horizon
explosion it was apparent that the necessary resources to resolve the exception were not
readily available.

Within hours, BP began hiring vessels to skim oil off the surface of

the water and began ordering boom in an attempt to surround and contain oil that was
rapidly gushing from the blown out well (Resnick-Ault and Klimasinska, 2010).
Although BP was initially reluctant to use outside international assistance, four weeks
after the explosion, they began accepting skimmers, boom and technical assistance from
international partners with experience in cleaning up oil disasters (Eilperin and Kessler,
2010).
Fourth, in a catastrophe most or all of the community undergoes a period of prolonged
inoperability. Following the Deepwater Horizon explosion, large areas of the Gulf Coast
were deemed inoperable for human activity. On May 2, 2010, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Marine Fisheries Service began closing
an area of approximately 6,817 square miles, roughly three percent of the entire Gulf of
Mexico federal fishing zone and continued closing areas and by one month later, on June
2, 2010, it prohibited 37 percent of the entire federal Gulf fishing zone (National
Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). Later,
in May and July 2010, President Barack Obama issued a moratorium on offshore drilling
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for an indefinite term that was later clarified as six months (National Public Radio, 2010).
At the local and state level, much of the fishing and tourist communities have remained
closed due to the impact of the Deepwater Horizon spill and some jobs, businesses will
never recover (Alpert, 2010b).
Fifth, in a catastrophe the mass media, especially in recent times, socially constructs the
occasion. With the proliferation of twenty-four hour cable news, the Internet, blogs and
citizen reporters, perhaps the greatest changes have come in how catastrophe are
understood by those who experience the impact and the broader public. Since the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill was constructed as an exception that was facilitated largely
through rational-technical means, this sensitized the media, the public, and policymakers
to hold BP accountable for all damages related to the impact.
A frequent source of discussion in the media was the flow rate of oil into the Gulf of
Mexico emanating from the Macondo oil well. Although initial estimates from BP were
that 1,000 barrels per day might be flowing into the Gulf of Mexico, at a press conference
on April 28, 2010, Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry stated that the flow of oil
entering the Gulf could be as much as 5,000 barrels per day, a number that was later
deemed highly speculative (National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling, 2011). As was later acknowledged in the national commission
report to the President, over the next four weeks, the media frequently repeated the
number and it remained the official estimate of the spill size. However, once video from
the feed of the blowout became publically available, it soon became apparent that the size
of the exception was far larger than reported. More recent official estimates place the
low number at more than ten times those initial estimates with 52,700 to 62,200 barrels of
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oil spilling per day into the Gulf for a total of approximately 4.9 million barrels, by far
the largest maritime oil spill in United States history (National Commission on the
BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 2011). Another aspect of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill that was socially constructed by the media, albeit to a lesser
extent, was the lack of specificity of who, and where was being impacted. Many
Floridians, particularly those living and working south of the Panhandle, expressed
frustration that national media was not informing the public that their beaches and tourist
attractions were open and that little tar or oil had washed ashore, especially during the
peak of tourist season (National Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, 2011). These sentiments were perhaps best expressed by Keith
Overton, Chairman of the Florida Restaurant and Lodging Association who stated:
These losses have occurred in our area in the Tampa Bay area, without a single drop of
oil ever reaching our beach and that is true for most of Florida. Pensacola has had some
oil but the rest of the panhandle is in pretty good shape right now. But you wouldn’t
know that if you looked at the national news media or you read the newspaper each day.‖
Finally, because of the previous five processes, in a catastrophe the political arena
becomes even more important in dealing with the impact and response. As noted
previously, all disasters of course involve, at a minimum, local political considerations.
However, it is a radically different occasion when the national government and the elite
officials become directly involved in the process (Quarantelli, 2006). Following the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, local, state, national, and international media played an
important role in attempting to deal with response. At the local level, particularly in
Louisiana, government officials frequently reported being stretched beyond capacity,
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which is common in catastrophe, given the scale of the exception as evidenced by
Jefferson Parish (Louisiana) President Steve Theriot who stated, ―We don’t have
enough assets in the world to take care of the Gulf Coast (Rainey, 2010:1).‖
At the state level, politics played a very important role in shaping responsibility for the
recovery. Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal repeatedly blamed BP for the oil spill and
repeatedly requested funds to protect the Louisiana shorelines (Alpert 2010a). Jindal told
national media that ―We're in a war here to fight to protect our way of life‖ and
repeatedly requested for more help from the federal government, specifically Jindal
asking that Coast Guard officers be assigned to each affected parish who could
immediately OK requests for additional boom or other assistance (Alpert, 2010a). At the
federal level, President Barack Obama made numerous trips to the impacted Gulf Coast
region and held a high profile prime-time press conference, the first in months, to address
problems with the federal response to the BP oil spill (Obama, 2010). On cable news
networks, television pundits such as James Carville critiqued President Obama calling
him ―naïve‖ for entrusting BP with command over a spill they created (Basset, 2010:1).
Many in the national media began to wonder if the lackluster response amounted to
―Obama’s Katrina‖ (Macmanus, 2010). Such framing of responsibility and failure is
indicative of the problem partisan politicians in facing a catastrophe, a scale of exception
that adequate planning and preparation is often too complex to execute prior to the
exception.
Discussion and Policy
This paper has explored how disaster and catastrophe are rooted in social exceptions that
generate change to socio-historically constructed projects across space and time. We
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have also attempted to draw a conceptual distinction between disaster and catastrophe.
Catastrophe is different from a disaster in that most or all of a community or area is
impacted, many local individuals are unable to undertake their usual roles, the
community undergoes a period of prolonged inoperability, media plays an increasing role
in the construction of the public perception of the occasion, and the political arena shifts
from a local or regional issue to a national or international one. This paper explores the
Deepwater Horizon explosion and subsequent oil spill and finds substantive support for
that occasion as a catastrophe.
The distinction between disaster and catastrophe is not simply an academic one, as
national and international policymakers have recently become sensitized to differences
between these distinctions, and emergency management professionals and policymakers
have asserted that more academic research is needed to empirically falsify
conceptualization distinctions (Blanchard, 2008). Perhaps the most important
consideration for policymakers is the scope of the catastrophe exception. Catastrophe is
such a large, cascading exception that it is exceedingly difficult to preposition enough
resources prior to the occasion and even if it were possible, the severity of the exception
would likely damage many of the prepositioned resources further exacerbating the
exception. Catastrophes also often sensitize the public and policy to flaws in the existing
social projects such as along age, race, class and gender and geography as the most
socially vulnerable are often at greatest risk (Wisner et al., 2004).
Catastrophes also require the effective coordination of a variety of emergency
management professionals, technical experts, and policymakers, often for the first time,
to confront an occasion that is often the most challenging most have ever encountered.
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To combat these considerable challenges, we suggest that policymakers develop a model
of network governance. A network governance model is ideal for dealing with complex
problems that require shared oversight with partners from diverse networks to ensure that
the network goals are met. Network governance begins with a focus on incorporating
diverse individuals and diverse knowledge through the establishment of linkages across
social frontiers. A social frontier is any place where two or more social worlds meet and
where people of one kind meet people from another kind (Burt, 1992). For example,
emergency management professionals, technical experts, and policymakers frequently
compose three separate social worlds, often with little connection to one another.
Although a lack of connection between social worlds is not inherently problematic,
sociologists have known for some time that different social worlds often have access to
different forms of knowledge and when information is shared between worlds, problems
can more effectively be resolved (Granovetter, 1973).
Connections across social frontiers offer the possibility that those with diverse
knowledge about catastrophe will have better access to policymakers and those
policymakers in a position to do something about reducing the size of exception may be
more inclined to do so. However, transmitting knowledge does not necessarily ensure
that the underlying problems associated with catastrophe can be avoided. Policymakers,
or those in a position to do something about the problem, must be willing to take
effective measures to resolve the catastrophe as soon as possible after impact.
Another important policy aspect of catastrophe, particularly in light of anthropogenic
catastrophes such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, is that traditionally, policymakers
govern by focusing on whether individuals, organizations or institutions are in
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compliance with the existing law, and hold hearings as to whether the current law is
effective. In contrast,
governance is the process of monitoring and surveillance of individual or institutional
behavior to ensure the continuity of the overall system (Eisenhardt, 1989). Governance
does not necessarily mean an absence of law or regulation or that compliance no longer
needs to be met, but rather, focuses policymaker’s attention toward monitoring the
overall goals of the an industry.
Since our contemporary socio-historical project is one of rapidly expanding innovation
leading to profit opportunities, effective risk management and surveillance are important
aspects of this process that may not necessarily require regulation but oversight.
Therefore, in some sectors of the private sector, particularly in new or emerging areas,
monitoring and oversight may offer ample protection against adverse risk, provided
policymakers have access to knowledge from diverse viewpoints about how new areas
are developing within the private sector. Thus, by linking networks of academics,
technical experts, and policymakers across social frontiers into a framework focused on
governance, it may be possible to reduce the severity and duration of future
anthropogenic catastrophes.
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